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German and Austrian historical thought since the Enlightenment: individual and national historical logics

Language expresses thought and its perceptions as objects, but it also by following thought's rhythm...its pace, the continuity and discontinuity of its flux imparts the characteristic affinities by which differing nations order thought and perception.  
Wilhelm von Humboldt, The national character of language (c. 1823)

The integration of the individual with the reinforcing stimulus and energy of the nation is the critical point in the spiritual economy of the human race.  
Wilhelm von Humboldt, "The Integration of Individuals and Nations," (1827-1829)

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The four volumes which this abstract introduces are designed to present a theory and an array of case studies that illustrate the integration of individual and national historical logics in personal expression in the German and Austrian nations since the Enlightenment. The historical thought of historians and other scholars and scientists in Germany and Austria in the many generations since the Enlightenment are considered in their individually nuanced historical logic, and the rhetorical features of their expression that reflect their respective national historical logics.

I selected two citations from Wilhelm von Humboldt as epigraphs for these volumes as he has been an influence on German and Austrian insight into the interplay of language and thought since the Enlightenment. His concept of the "inner form" of thought and language, a logical-grammatical Gestalt which pre-reflectively imparts its form to each sentential judgment, is central to the evidence I examine of a lifelong style of historical logic in each individual, and a national historical logic, present in every generation, that plays its role in individual historical thinking.<sup>[1]</sup> Humboldt's intense interest in historiography, coupled with his awareness of the role of language in historical consciousness, has been an influence on my own historiographical inquiry. Either directly through his writings, or through those Germans and Austrians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who have cited him in their own work, his thinking has been omnipresent through my inquiries into the differentiation of individual historical thinking as it integrates culturally reinforced perspectives.

Humboldt was keenly aware of the crucial role of the nation on forms of language expression, and the manner in which these forms condition one's ordering of events. A historical logic, as I will argue, is how one orders the succession of events or event-moments in one's experience. Historical time, as well as our immediate sense of time's passage, is generated by the continuities and/or discontinuities imparted to events and event moments in our judgment. Humboldt emphasized the determinative influence of a national culture as it lends us the language to express our historical judgment. He also suggests that our individual thought, which partakes of language but is separate, is both guided and shaped by the language forms lent to it by the nation.

I will not give the national culture and its language such a primary, generative role in my theoretical analyses. My reliance on the insights of German and Austrian critical and phenomenological philosophy, and my studies of contemporary linguistics, suggest to me that a national culture and language, while the venue of an individual's thought, is a secondary leaven in human judgment. One's individual sense of time and history is refracted through national norms of historical understanding, but has a deeper, singular root in each person's cognition. It is within this individual, singular root that a lifelong personal style of historical thought emerges, leavened then with the generational priorities of one's nation.

In the second epigraph, Humboldt underscores the critical juncture of the individual with the national heritage of cultural thought and expression. Humboldt wrote this reflection in a period of German cultural history I will examine as extremely *collective* in its emphases. *The individual* was defined by and large by the group in its many forms. Earlier in the closing decade of the Enlightenment, in a period of European history that stressed the individual, Humboldt was more concerned, as many of his peers, with the spiritual singularity of personal individuation as the driving force of culture.

Considering the integration of the individual historical vision with that of the nation is a chiaroscuro which can be seen in differing emphases. As I will demonstrate, there is a pendulum shift over generations between collective and individual emphases in considering historical causation. We live now in an emerging age of individuality, and perhaps correspondingly, my evidence emphasizes the formative influence of individual historical logic upon the national historical vision of the nation. Moreover, it is only out of the lexicon of individual differences distributed throughout a population that a nationally normative sense of history evolves. The styles of ordering events that are individually rooted provide the essential lexicon out of which national norms of event-structure are formed. The public needs of the nation condition how its individual voices are judged, and how they are shaped in the norms and genres of public forms of communication; but, only out of the living judgments of individuals can the artifacts of language be manipulated into the national standards of a time.

The four individual historical logics out of which national norms of historical thought are composed are termed by me *continuity*, *quantum*, *continuum*, and *dialectic*. Each historical logic differs significantly in how it orders the continuities and/or discontinuities of events and event-moments. Each historical logic is located in the grammatical structure of every sentential judgment. These individual historical logics are not found solely in German and Austrian individuals. My studies have shown me that these four logical-grammatical constructs of historical judgment are distributed throughout all Western populations. Moreover, these four logical-grammatical constructs are intergenerational, appearing in every past age of Western culture. If Noam Chomsky is correct about a 'universal grammar,' then these four historical logics are probably present in every world population, in every age. The lifelong constancy of a historical logic, evident in the earliest sentences of persons, is probably a genetic inclination. My studies of twins in the fourth volume attests to this probability.

The national historical logics, on the other hand, while maintaining intergenerational constancy, are political-sociological phenomenon. A national historical logic is not genetic to a population, even as it is formed out of that population's distribution of individual historical logics. The contingencies of event that affect the lives of a people within a nation occasion the need for historical principles of explanation and guidance shared among those who adhere to a national togetherness. Out of the natural, genetic logical-grammatical lexicon of the culture's language, a national historical perspective will be stylized for the norms of judging by the arbiters of national culture. These historical norms, however, are always dependent in their expression not only upon the range of logical-grammatical possibilities presented by individual historical logics, but the articulation of their norms within an individual discourse. A 'nation' cannot think and judge, only the individual can. Ultimately, the logic of history is a cognitive creation in each individual consciousness. As in fashion in dress or dining, arbiters of the national historical norms stylize certain perspectives towards history. The public choices normed by the arbiters appear in tropic styles of commentary and more formal designs of historical argument. There is never full self-consciousness even in the arbiters as to the historiographical premises. Rather, a certain attitude towards historical succession has a resonance, seems a 'right order.' While the national historical logic is a derived style of positing events and event-moments out of the lexicon of individual historical logics, it nonetheless plays a coexistent role in an individual's cognition of historical time. History is a perceptual phenomenon in its individual and national aspects.

There is no cosmically uniform, qua objective, historical time. Historical time differs with each person judging the event in question. Historical time as a product of human cognition varies according to styles of temporal judgment. This is not a novel claim. Since Immanuel Kant, Western approaches to historiography have deepened our understanding of the cognitive complexities of historical judgment. The phenomenological and linguistic bases of my theory are linked to the history of analyses into the 'deep structure' of cognition. I consider the historiographical heuristic I offer in this work to be within the phenomenological project begun with Immanuel Kant's views of the constitution of temporality in forms of cognition, and continued through Edmund Husserl's views of the logical-grammatical constitution of time. My attention to the grammar of the sentential judgment as a genesis and venue of styles of historical judgment is linked as well to contemporary studies of generative and transformational grammar. The syntactic and semantic geneses of temporal understandings that are considered 'historical logic' are viewed as the cognitive foundations of both the individual and the national aspects of historical judgment.

Nationally, the conventions of a historical logic are known both informally in everyday expressions and in the more formal genres that govern the historical aspects of inquiry and expression. The genres of literature, historical writing, and scientific explanation into event-structures are composed intuitively out of the lexicon of temporal constructs provided by the individual historical logics. This intuitive construction is generated by the private as well as public demand for forms of *narration* that communicate a succession of events comprehensible to all parties. A narrative is a style of articulating the succession of events and event-moments of human experience. While Western culture provides narrative norms self-consciously in each area of the arts and the sciences, the cognitive bases of these self-conscious norms are to be found in the historical-logical genetic styles of continuity, quantum, continuum, and dialectic thinking. Examining the narrative norms of these genres as derivations of the individual historical logics locates narration and its genres within the operations of historical judgment. Hayden White has opened this avenue of analysis with his discussion of "deep temporality" and narrative in the narrative theory of Paul Ricoeur.<sup>[2]</sup> White's extensive analyses of the relationships between semantics and historical vision are central to his understanding of the temporalities generated by narrative structure.<sup>[3]</sup> I am deeply indebted to White in these regards.

A national historical logic will create a distinct schema of continuity and discontinuity, duration and change in what transpires. The schema of the national historical logic is not to be found within the single sentential judgment as is the schema of the individual historical logic. Rather, the national historical logic occurs over an entire narration, over the diachronic development of an exposition, explanation, or argument. All persons who mature in that culture take on this schema. Out of the normative manner of conceiving events arose the formal genres of historiography in Germany and Austria which have been called *historicism* and/or *historism*.<sup>[4]</sup> German *historicism* is a genre of historiography that expresses a distinct manner of ordering continuity and discontinuity. Austrian *historicism* will vary from the German model. Yet, *historicism* in each nation is but one genre that has this schema of duration and change: all informal and formal thought reflects the national norms of what constitutes the historical flux of events. The national "event structure" is always the same, at least since the Enlightenment.

An individual historical logic gives a nuanced twist to the national perspective. A person will see history essentially in each moment with the event structure of his or her individual historical logic, whether that be of *continuity*, *quantum*, *continuum*, or *dialectic*. What I will demonstrate as an unchanging individual historical logic will be located in every well-formed sentence of the person. Each immediate phenomenon articulated in a sentence is so ordered by that person grammatically in its phrasal and clausal structure to present what I will show is an invariant historical order of any occurrence whatsoever, a style of historical logic that persists for that person over a career of thought. What I demonstrate as a national historical logic will be rhetorical features that occur piecemeal in the semantics of each sentential judgment, whose summative presence is realized by the end of an argument or explanation.

These two levels of historical thinking have differing origins. Individual historical logic appears to be of 'psychogenetic' origin. The invariant individual historical logic is manifest from the time the person first masters the "well-formed" sentence.<sup>[5]</sup> My evidence suggests, when one considers contemporary studies of causal attribution by pre-adolescent children, that what I delineate as an individual style of historical thought emerges as the person first conceives temporal succession.<sup>[6]</sup> National historical logic, while using the logical-grammatical products of individual thought in building expository perspectives, is generated by adults in order to comprehend and accommodate the community to its historical experience. A national historical logic must be learned. The communications of one's parents, one's schooling, exposure to national literature and other cultural media, all gradually instruct one in how to formulate the nationally normative vision of history.

What is remarkable in studying the German and Austrian individual in cultural history (and implied in my findings and prior studies, any individual from any culture) is that neither the individual historical-logical style nor the national historical-logical style is self-consciously, i.e. reflectively discerned. Individual historical logic is ignored. The individual's historical assertions are measured rather by the standards of the national historical logic. The national historical-logical standards are assumed to be universal and scientifically objective. The standards involve methods of inquiry and quality of evidence. Yet, despite the high level of conscious standardization, until Hayden White's studies in narrative style and temporality the historical consciousness generated by particular uses of language and narrative design have remained largely opaque.<sup>[7]</sup> Historiographical analysis of narrative is most often solely what constitutes good grammar and communicability in that culture. Peter Gay's essays on style and historical understanding joins Hayden White's studies as among the few that have probed language and temporal construction.<sup>[8]</sup> Literary critics have contributed greatly to a comprehension of the relation between logical-grammatical style and temporal perspective since Leo Spitzer in the 1920s. Yet, these incisive studies have been largely limited appreciations of an author's style in its construction of states-of-affairs that create temporal perspectives, but fall short of historiographical theory. Paul Ricoeur's *Time and Narrative* has augmented such studies by fusing a historiographical perspective to the study of narrative.<sup>[9]</sup>

Another line of criticism, that of methodology in the arts and the sciences, made accessible as venues of historical understanding the stylistic constructions of genres of inquiry and explanation. The closing decades of the nineteenth century marked the inception of a metacognitive awareness in the Western arts and

sciences that laid the foundation for an assessment of the generational arbitrariness of disciplinary 'logics,' and the role of a disciplinary manner of ordering events in the inquirer's appreciation of temporality. Friedrich Nietzsche's criticism of historical consciousness was among this pioneering self-assessment. Astute critics within particular disciplines began to comment upon expository styles and changing generational norms in how historical evidence was presented. Ernst Mach revealed that the historical order of cause and effect in physics has had generational emphases in its exposition. Friedrich Meinecke gave his nation a detailed overview of its national historical logic of historicism. Nonetheless, the insights were limited to the disciplines. Awareness that both professionals and laypersons within a national culture in a particular generation were educated into the same 'right order' of historical succession by the very forms of popular culture of a generation, and, in that generation, a metaparadigm shared among all the special fields of inquiry has remained an opaque reality. National standards of historicity are 'opaque' because culture has as yet not demanded that one become aware of how time is stylized in either popular or scientific discourse, or how the national characteristics of historical judgment are wedded subtly one's own invariant historical logic in every episode of historical judgment.

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Why do I call the grammatical order of a sentence an individual "historical logic?" I base this premise on the traditional principles of critical and phenomenological epistemology from Immanuel Kant through Edmund Husserl. I will quote several thoughts by Kant and Husserl in this section, and comment upon my augmentation of these ideas, in order to provide an initial understanding of my phenomenological inquiry into the historical time conveyed by the logic of each grammatical sentence. Kant in discussing the organization of experiential data into the schemata that synthesize the data into a coherent manifold in each judgment emphasizes the *flowing*, i.e. time-generating character of what is conceived. Each content of experience that becomes an element of a sentential judgment is considered by Kant a "magnitude," that is a spatially extended thing or state-of-affairs:

Such magnitudes may also be called *flowing*, since the synthesis of productive imagination involved in their production is a progression in time (Critique of Pure Reason, A 170, B 212).<sup>[10]</sup>

The categories of judgment that organize experiential data as magnitudes into this flowing progression in every predication are quantity, quality, relation, and modality.

Each of these categories, respectively, gives the magnitude its particular form and properties. Every well-formed sentence imparts an event or event-moment by so synthesizing the perceived content. The play of these categories in the successive constitution of the sentential judgment generate the perceived temporal flux or progression in time:

The schema of magnitude (quantity) is the generation (synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object. The schema of quality is the synthesis of sensation or perception with representation of time; it is the filling of time. The schema of relation is the connecting of perceptions with one another at all times according to a rule of time-determination. Finally the schema of modality and of its categories is time itself as the correlate of the determinations whether and how an object belongs to time. The schemata are thus nothing but *a priori* determinations of time in accordance with rules. These rules relate in the order of the categories to the *time-series*, the *time-content*, the *time-order*, and lastly to the *scope of time* in respect to all possible objects (Critique of Pure Reason, A 145, B 185).

Allow me for the moment to comment upon just one of these categorical geneses of time in a sentence predication---the quantitative succession given to what is predicated. All data of experience become an event or event-moment by the flux generated by the quantitative succession or time-series. The phrasal and clausal succession of a sentence in their semantics and syntax articulate the event or event-moment in a certain sequence that is the time-series. Continuity and/or discontinuity may be imparted by the phrasal and clausal sequential articulation. Successive parts that relate to a governing whole, or contrasting wholes and their entailed parts in the same sentence offer differing visions of continuity and discontinuity, change or duration.

This quantitative logic of succession in each sentence in its continuities and/or discontinuities is called by Edmund Husserl in his logic of parts and wholes the "time-stretch" design of the state-of-affairs (Logical Investigations, III, Par. 25).<sup>[11]</sup> Husserl discusses the amalgam of "time-stretches" which coalesce in each sentential judgment, emphasizing the complex temporalities which enter each such judgment. He goes on in his Investigation IV to propose a grammar that enables one to appreciate the meaning forms generated out of the part-whole relationships which form the sentential judgment (Logical Investigations, IV, Par. 13.) Each meaning-form would be an ideal standard for the actual logical-grammatical articulation of the state-of-affairs in the empirical judgment (Logical Investigations, IV, Par. 14). Each ideal logical-grammatical meaning-form could be considered as an equivalent of an ideal time-stretch design generated out of the range idealized part-whole relationships conceivable by human judgment (Logical Investigations, III, Par. 13, p. 486-487). Meaning, thus, is equated with not only the significance of content and its relations, but with the temporality of what is perceived. The grammatical meaning forms themselves can be understood as derivations of the "temporal concretums" which were the foundations of every cognized experiential moment (Logical Investigations, III, Par. 13, p. 488).

That a sentential judgment can create an *individual style of historical knowing*, a historical logic that is the enduring basis of historical vision for that individual, is not considered by Husserl. Kant, however, does allow for such an appreciation. He compares his own vision of human experience through time with Leibniz, characterizing Leibniz's view of states-of-affairs as a "continuity," whereas he sees evidence in the same states-of-affairs for "discontinuities" (Critique of Pure Reason, A 668, B 696). Kant sees a certain justice in both points of view given the evidence that is revealed, rather than arguing for the objectivity solely of his own. As I discuss the four kinds of historical logic imparted by the grammatical style of sentential judgment that I have discerned in the many generations of German and Austrian individuals, I will elaborate on how each historical logic complements another with its distinctive kind of evidence. All historical logics are necessary for a manifold understanding of our common human experience. No one historical logic can offer sufficient data for our common cultural needs of knowing.

A historical logic of *continuity* is one that conceives each moment as an integer in an open-ended, incremental series of events:  $1+1+1\dots+1$ . This incremental chain goes forward into infinity, coming from a past that has a distant origin, into a future that remains part of this series. Modern critics of Western culture have called this conception 'linear' time, faulting it as being conducive to a narrow, teleological conception of history. All the event-moments of this incremental chain share a general character that enable one to conceive the totality of the chain. Nonetheless each event moment is singular in its properties, relating to the incremental chain as a species to a genus. The symbolic manner of demonstrating the part-whole relationships that constitute the amalgam of time-stretches in this historical logic can be expressed by the formula  $C_nCB_nA_n$ : where the general character that overarches all entailed events is ' $A_n$ ', and the entailed events or event-moments are ' $C_n$ ' and ' $B_n$ '. ' $A_n$ ' is an overarching whole that implies ' $B_n$ ' and ' $C_n$ ' are parts of its existence. There are two distinct events or event-moments in the sentential judgments of continuity thinkers ' $B_n$ ' and ' $C_n$ '. They are always shown as differing persons, places, things, or intentions, giving the continuity event structure the vision of an encounter. Both ' $B_n$ ' and ' $C_n$ ' are wholes in their own right, coming from differing directions with their own existent careers. As each has its own career, meeting only in this event, the sentence has the two separate entailed events or event-moments intersecting ' $C$ '. The ' $n$ ' of the formula expresses how in any sentential judgment, several manifestations of either ' $B_n$ ', ' $C_n$ ', or ' $A_n$ ' can be discerned. Two kinds of time exist for the continuity thinker--the broad, general sense of a coherent organization of every event or event-moment, and the singular immediacy of the encounter of ' $B_n$ ' and ' $C_n$ ' in their

paths of encounter. Each reflective deliberation made by a continuity thinker can stress either the time of the 'A', or the time of the 'BCC'.

Continuity logic enables a cultural decision-making that preserves existing concepts of action in time, reflected in the mores, institutions, and other practices of the culture, by dint of this logic's insistence upon the continuity of an overarching temporality that entails the events of the moment. A telic universe of reference is created in which individuals are seen to pursue their own careers of movement, but in doing so contributing to the existence of the authoritative mores, folkways, and extant public realities. Every human culture requires this emphasis upon a shared world, despite the evident contingencies and differences of human activity. The differences between persons and their values, beliefs, and interests is simultaneously shown in the continuity logic by placing the temporality of one entity in an intersectional meeting with another ' $C_nCB_n$ '.

*Quantum* historical logic, a variation that Immanuel Kant first defined in differentiating this logic from that of continuity, treats historical experience as composed of discontinuous, self-subsistent wholes (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 204, A 170, B 212). Each event in time--a whole--contains some general features--the parts--that give it a quantum cohesiveness, but there is an "ever ceasing" boundary that separates one cohesive set of actions from another (204, A 170, B 212). Where the historical logic of continuity forms events into a successive or incremental chain, quantum historical logic sees between events gaps that imply non-relatedness (548, A 558, B 696).

Quantum historical logic as it appears in every sentential judgment can be expressed in its relationships of parts and wholes, i.e. its amalgam of time-stretches, by the symbolic formula ' $f(A_n)/A_n$ ': where ' $A_n$ ' is the whole in every event or event-moment, and ' $f(A_n)$ ' expresses the event or event-moments as functions of that general meaning or *Gestalt*. Any particular event or event-moment is the equivalent '/' of the whole in that moment as it is that whole in its functioning. History in its particulars is simultaneously the manifestation of a formal cause that is pervasive. Here all cognized moments of a sentential judgment share a general character; they do not have their separate careers. In this moment in history the identities of what is cognized is totally of that general theme. Another moment can relate what is seen to another theme. Thus, no continuities are assumed between one historical moment and another. Quantum historical logic enables a cultural decision-making that brings new understandings of action in time, understandings that find an individual act can in itself create a new order for all who share the culture. This remarkable assertion, articulated by Nietzsche in *The Birth of Tragedy*, occurs because the individual act is seen as an instantiation of collective temporality. Many historians have shared this vision that focuses upon the quantum collective which is expressed directly in the intuition and action of the individual. Dialectical logic will also express this sense of the phenomenal immediacy of an individual and a collective time articulated by each gesture in that time, however dialectical logic, as its concept indicates, situates every phenomenal immediacy and its collective import within a sequence of developmental stages. Quantum logic does not speak of developmental teleologies, only of the immediate time. Quantum durations can be interrupted or end; teleology is not a function of its time stretch. Quantum logic gives the society a radical freedom to change based upon visionary voices who like Nietzsche, or his teacher Jacob Burckhardt, envisioned coherent ages that begin and end. Quantum logic is the counterforce to the conservative vision of the continuous time.

*Continuum* historical logic is the setting of arbitrary terminuses of beginnings and endings. There is no sense of an infinite, incremental chain from the past and into the future, rather an attention to spans of time whose constituents are seen to be loosely related. Nor does the continuum thinker see quantum cohesion among particulars. Rather contingent association is the guide in temporal relations. The continuum thinker will be more concerned than individuals with other historical logics in evaluating how and why certain events form their temporal relationships. This evaluative circumspection seems to be caused by the very salience of 'contingency' in establishing the relations that constitute the continuum. Thus, the continuum thinker is more in the mold of what Nietzsche has called the critical historian.

Continuum logic's amalgam of time-stretches composed of its distinct part-whole relationships in each sentential judgment can be symbolically expressed as ' $A_n e B_n C C_n$ ': where a continuum is formed between the alpha event or event-moment 'A' and the omega event or event-moment 'B'. The continuum thinker will underscore the contingency of the continuum chosen by showing a third event moment that is neither entailed or comprehended by 'A' or 'B'. One can view 'A', 'B', and 'C' as independent wholes that happen to coincide in the mind of the observer. A continuum historical logic enables a cultural decision-making which assumes that every time which succeeds another may or may not share common properties. There are no overarching temporalities, rather temporal contiguities. Thus, no telic, i.e. directionally inclined, or more marked teleological succession of events may be postulated. The greatest freedom to act individually in time is expressed in a continuum logic because of its absence of either the horizontal *telos* of continuity or dialectical thinking or the vertical pull of a quantum collective for each individual gesture. Yet, the continuum vision of time also harbors the greatest scepticism over the collective outcome of any individual act. Lacking any entailing or comprehending reality, the bald successive temporalities of the continuum thinker offer a dizzying freedom, and a metacognitive pessimism regarding historical 'development.'

*Dialectical* historical logic reflects the same establishment of a continuity that emerges from a seemingly infinite past into an infinite future as *continuity* historical logic, but incorporates the notion of quantum phases which conflict with or interrupt that incremental line of change. Integration of the opposed quantum in a larger quantum is realized as in classic dialectical theory. There is a more recognizable accord between the logical-grammatical design of the dialectical sentence and the conceptual premises of the conscious theory than in the three other logics. That is because of the marked shifts of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in the syntax of the dialectical thinker's sentence. One is tempted when reading the evidence of the dialectical logic, especially in articulate thinkers, to ascribe the cause to the conscious conception. This is when the evidence of early adolescent writings serves an important purpose in demonstrating the grammatical foundations of a maturing, conscious philosophy.

Dialectical logic in each sentential judgment so orders its parts and wholes in their succession that the event depicted passes through the phases of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. A symbolic formula of this process can be expressed by ' $A_n/A_n w B_n . e . \sim A_n w \sim B_n w C_n$ ': where ' $A_n$ ' are two moments of the same state-of-affairs expressed as a thesis-antithesis juxtaposition, i.e. ' $A_i/A_j$ '. These are equivalents as they are held as two face or possible understandings of the state-of-affairs. ' $A_n/B_n$ ' is present when two differing states-of-affairs are shown as equivalents in a juxtaposition of thesis/antithesis, i.e. contrasting actualities or possibilities. The sentential judgment, through its extension of phrase and/or clause then moves these juxtaposed states-of-affairs into a common synthesis, that is ' $. e . C_n$ ', or perhaps the failure of a common synthesis ' $. e . \sim A_n w \sim B_n$ '. Dialectical sentential logic is as complex a vision of temporality as it appears in this formula. Long sequences of time are intimately interrelated. Teleology, not a more modest and open telic direction, is the rule. There are no contingencies once a sequence moves individual times into a channel of development. Like Mark Twain's short-cut channels--"chutes"--through the Mississippi's islands, once one enters there is no turning around. Individual choice is finally seen in the synthetic temporal understanding of the dialectic as always having been a choice in a fixed universe of collective choices (for that sequence of times). There are periods when a society must follow such a long-range, convergent plan. As with the tribes who followed Moses into the desert, failure to see the long-range plan, because of the ostensible absence of necessity, is cultural suicide. Continuum logic is an antidote for such often wrong-headed cultural compulsion. Continuity logic allows a more relaxed attention than the dialectical to long range temporal rhythms and their institutional housings. But, when focused change is in order, dialectical historical vision, if correct, is the only path through the needle eye of self-preservation. Quantum logic is the clarion call for beginnings and endings. Quantum logic is the historical logic of the prophet. But, dialectical logic prophesizes with the evidence of complex durations of past experience and its successive changes.

The four individual historical logics are not *national historical logics*, yet the national historical logic is formed out of the possible "temporal concretums" (Husserl) that compose the time-stretch designs of the four individual historical logics. The national historical logic at any given time in the public communications of a nation is an amalgam drawn out of the temporal concretums which characterize each of four individual historical logics. Certain combinations of time-stretch designs accomplish distinct temporal emphases that accommodate national historical situations. History becomes nationally either more or less continuous or discontinuous, depending upon the distinct amalgam of temporal concretums. Genres within the arts and the sciences that express historical points of view take on form and change form within the selection of temporal concretums that are emphasized as in a generation as a public language. I will analyze two disciplinary genres in Germany and Austria in great depth to show how each nation adapted these genres to its peculiar historical needs. *Historicism* over the several generations between the Enlightenment and the present is explored as a temporalization with persisting idiosyncratic elements that differentiate the two nations. Generational variations in each nation's *historicism* will be illustrated. The German and Austrian novelle will also be a subject for analysis, exhibiting the same differentiating national characteristics carried by the historiographical styles. Germany will emphasize the infinite, teleological flux of the past into the present and future with an amalgam of primarily continuity and dialectical logic. Ceaseless, incremental, yet often dramatic change will be conveyed, thereby. The political-social grounds of this national historical logic is to be found in the changing territorial experiences of the many German principalities, always seeking and finding new territorial relationships. Austria will emphasize durational reality in its expression of these genres, using a combination of quantum and morphological historical logics. Morphological logic is a variant of the dialectical in which an initial form develops phase by phase, maintaining its essential identity over often contrasting phases. Austrian quantum reality is more enduring than quantum historical expression in other cultures. The persisting authority of the Habsburgs over their crownlands, and their symbolic authority as Holy Roman Emperors, help to explain this durational bias.

A national historical logic is a normative manner for that nation's populace of conceiving the nature and meaning of the historical flux of events. A national historical logic becomes a narrative, as through its accounts it orders the actions and interactions of individuals into sequences of behavior and issue resolution. A national historical logic in its variety of public expressions provides a model for not only interpreting the historical experience of what has been, but a model of normative historical order for one's contemporary public and private activity. It is created in response to the contingencies of historical experience. A national historical logic will change in its characteristics over time as a consequence of the nation's changing history. A national historical logic is not only the formal historiographical creations of those who practice the discipline of history. It is also the historical perspective of novelists, dramatists, journalists, and other professionals who contribute to the historical understanding of the nation's populace. The dissemination of a national historical logic is a combined effort of the many institutional expressions of the nation's culture--the press and other communications media, the schools, and other private and public organs.

My demonstration of the national historical logics of Germany and Austria between the Enlightenment and the present does not rely only upon the self-conscious conceptions of the people of these cultures. To be sure, the narrative constructions of historical experience by members of each nation were to some degree self-conscious artifacts of deliberation. Styles in their standards are explicable, but why these delineaments of knowing and not others are less transparent. The cultural concept of "right order", found in every world culture, helps explain the intuitive limits of what makes sense in that nation's historical logic. Each discipline in its procedures and explanations within that culture's arts and sciences, every religious expression in its liturgical and ceremonial emphases, and even the common sense norms of its everyday transactions will exhibit its cultural "right order." All world cultures have concepts that underscore the idea of a "right order" of things--in Greece it was the concept *aidios*, in Egypt *maat*, in China the *tao*. The "right orders" change as the underlying values and intentions of a nation change. At times there is a general agreement, at times competing "right orders." One is educated into national historical-logical norms as one learns to communicate in written (and oral) expression. An example of the logical-grammatical presence of such a norm in the English culture of the Tudor and Stuart era is that of *antithesis*, a pervasive tropic figure in the construction of the sentence of that time. This semantic style, with its syntactical structuring, may have been how the political-social tensions were sustained.<sup>[12]</sup> Arthur Joseph Slavin has written of the Tudor-Stuart generations as a time of "permanent crisis" in which conflict was normative.<sup>[13]</sup>

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Humboldt, Schriften zur Sprachphilosophie in Wilhelm von Humboldt Werke in Fuenf Baenden (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta, 1963), 3: 463-475.

ite, The Content of the Form, Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins, 1987), 51-52.

White, Metahistory. The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University, 1973).

<sup>1</sup> of the differing uses of the terms is conveyed by Georg Iggers, The German Conception of History. The National Tradition of Historical Thought From Herder to the Present, revised own, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1968). Friedrich Meinecke has written the most definitively exhaustive study of German historicism, although he coined the term "historism" e movement as it developed from Leibniz through Ranke. See Friedrich Meinecke, Historism. The Rise of a New Historical Outlook, trans. J. E. Anderson (New York: Herder and <sup>2</sup>. R. Ankersmit differentiation of "historicism" from "historism" is the most extended discussion of which I am aware. See F.R. Ankersmit, Narrative Logic. A Semantic Analysis of Language (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), 3, 120-124, and F. R. Ankersmit, History and Tropology. The Rise and Fall of Metaphor (Berkeley\Los Angeles\London: University of 1994), 6-7 (fn 11), 185-186, 206-213. Further reference will be to these texts and editions. My differentiation of the two terms is essentially the same as his.

<sup>3</sup> Carl R. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (New York and London: Harper and Row, 1961), 143-152; and, Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, and Reason: Study in Nineteenth <sup>4</sup> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1971), 42-43. While correctly perceiving the teleological emphasis of historicist thought, Popper's and Mandelbaum's treatment overlooks both its value as a historical point-of-view. Hayden White's essay on historicism and the historical imagination is a fine counterargument for the justification and significance of historicist

ite, "Historicism, History, and the Figurative Imagination," Tropics of Discourse. Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University, 1978), 101-120.

sky, The acquisition of syntax in children from 5 to 10. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T., 1969), 1.

and her associates have isolated several different causal logics that differentiate children between two and three years of age. Her preferred etiology for these differing logics is al cognitive development in interaction with different aspects of the common linguistic code available. If that is the case, the decisional locus of the choice is nonconscious. See Lois food, What, when, and how about why: a longitudinal study of early expressions of causality. Monographs of the society for research in child development, 44, no. 6 (Chicago: icago, 1979).

Nelson considers in her empirical research with children the possibility of differing rule systems that underlie language performance. The rule systems operate in the Chomskyan conscious intelligence as logical principles that are enacted by a transformational generative grammar. Among the logical differences she has recognized in her research with children sus pronominal strategies, and analytical versus gestalt judgment. These types of differences will be observed in the four fundamental logics of historical judgment as well. See son, "Individual Differences in Language Development: Implications for Development and Language," Developmental Psychology (1981), Vol. 17, No. 2, 170-187.

ite's study of the temporality of the chronicle began the kind of narrative analysis that rigorously showed how time is structured in its logical-grammatical design; see "The Value of e Representation of Reality," The Content of the Form. Narrative Discourse and Historical Representaton (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1987), 1-25.

Style in Hlstory (New York: Basic Books, 1974). Gay's essays do not treat temporal construction through grammar in the explicit manner of White's analyses. Rather, he examines grammatical construction and their effects on historical ideation.

oeur, Time and Narrative, 3 volumes, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 1984-1988).

is from Kant throughout these volumes are from the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

usserl, Logical Investigations, Volume Two, trans. J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), 484-489. All further citations from Husserl's Logical Investigations are d edition.

J. Ong, The Technologizing of the Word (London and New York: Methuen, 1982), 115. Ong believes that one's being schooled in the rhetoric of antithesis contributed to attitudes and led conflict; Ong, Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology (Ithaca and London: Cornell University, 1971), 66.

ph Slavin, The Tudor Age and Beyond (Malabar, Florida: Robert E. Krieger, 1987), viii ff.